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The majority of the European countries have experienced a turn towards activation policies 
during the last two decades (Serrano Pascual et al., 2007, van Berkel/Borghi 2008, Bonoli 2010, 
Aurich 2011; Graziano 2009 and 2012). The interlinked aim to increase employment rates by 
integrating formerly excluded groups into the labour market requires new forms of 
governance and new structures of policy implementation. One of these policy changes 
concerns the marketization of employment and social services (Considine 2001, Newman 
2001), an important part of policy delivery in most welfare states although in very different 
forms and extents. Since the local level plays a crucial role in delivering policies (Künzel 2012, 
Green/Orton 2012) an important element, and the main focus of the paper, is the level of 
discretion of local actors and its relation to activation interventions. 
This paper draws on the findings of three qualitative case studies on the organisation of 
activation policies in three most different countries regarding worlds of welfare: Germany, 
Italy and the UK. It develops a theoretical framework of regulating marketization in regard to 
activation, and analyses the three empirical cases according to it.  The findings show a link 
between the regulation of market-based interventions (i.e. type of marketization, outsourcing 
decisions, and purchaser-provider split) and the level of discretion for local actors with regard 
to these measures. Local contexts of policy-making and their suitability and willingness to 
become marketized will affect the usage of local discretion. 
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1. Introduction 
Most western European welfare states have experienced a turn towards so-called activation 
policies during the last two decades. Different policy reforms have increasingly put the 
emphasis on activating individuals who are out of work by implementing various governance- 
and programmatic changes, in different policy schemes, such as social assistance, 
unemployment protection and disability benefits. 
From a broader perspective, these activation policies are often embedded in the context of 
broader reforms which imply changes beyond the simple introduction of new measures in 
existing systems. Already in the late 1970s/early 1980s, the concept of New Public 
Management (NPM, among others: Pollitt et al. 2007) came up and led to a shift in the 
perception of the role of the state in public discourses. In this framework, several countries 
have - especially since the late 1990s - adopted reforms tackling the relationship between the 
state, the individual, and the providers of welfare services: On the one hand, most activation 
reforms strengthen individual choice and responsibility by the introduction of financial 
incentives or sanctions; On the other hand, the provision of a very broad range of labour 
market measures and social services exists in order to increase individual employability (Aurich 
2011). In both dimensions, we often can observe a certain trend towards what has been called 
‘marketization’ (among others: van Berkel et al 2012). Although marketization is not the only 
relevant governance aspect of activation reforms, it has nevertheless become an important 
part of policy delivery in most welfare states, often supported by the assumption that 
contestability increases the efficiency and effectiveness of provision. However, marketization 
is not a clear concept itself, and national reforms under this label show a variation on 
regulation characteristics, which hold the potential to crucially affect activation policies in 
practice. However, the outcome of activation significantly depends on the lower tiers of policy 
implementation, where legal changes are implemented and often adapted to a given local 
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context. An important element in this regard, and the main focus of the paper, is the level of 
discretion of local actors and its relation to activation interventions. The argument we make is 
that marketization in the delivery of activation policies strongly emphasizes both individual 
responsibility and the need of a broader scope of actors to ensure targeted services. However, 
the way these activation principles are translated into practice strongly depends on their 
implementation at the local level, framed by the discretion local actors have with regard to the 
marketized services. This discretion varies across different activation schemes according to 
different policy regulations and institutional setups. Therefore, this study is set out to describe 
and analyse the regulation and explore the implementation of marketized integrated 
activation policies in different types of activation schemes. 
The analysis shows a clear link between the regulation of market-based interventions (i.e. type 
of marketization, outsourcing decisions, and purchaser-provider split) and the level of local 
discretion for local policy makers. With regard to the usage of this discretion, the explorative 
results show that it depends on the local contexts of policy-making and their suitability and 
willingness to become marketized. Therefore, notwithstanding a common marketization trend, 
its reach and its multilevel domestic adaptation varies in function of the embedded 
relationships (and its legacy) among levels of governments and stakeholders, rather than in 
function of the welfare regime type. 
First, the paper discusses governance reforms and marketization against the backdrop of 
activation policies in three different worlds of welfare and activation, namely Germany, Italy 
and the United Kingdom. We will then develop a theoretical framework of regulating 
marketization in regard to activation, which we will apply to three empirical cases, one in each 
country covered by this study. The national developments of the three countries will be then 
checked against what is happening at the local level. 
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2. Activation Policies and Marketization 
Activation policies aim at integrating broader parts of the population into the labour market. 
The approach developed in the 1990s is based on the assumption that long-term 
unemployment can have detrimental effects on individual employability thus manifesting 
structural unemployment (Jackman and Layard, 1991), and therefore, groups with significant 
barriers to labour market participation needed to be integrated into employment. Thus, in 
order to address the complex problems of unemployed and socially excluded persons, 
individual responsibility (often expressed by compulsion and incentives) was complemented by 
the provision of client-centred counselling and multiple social services tailored to individual 
needs. The provision of such services requires new structures of policy implementation and 
new forms of governance. In this regard, among the aspects of governance most frequently 
discussed are decentralisation, marketization, collaboration/network and NPM (van Berkel et 
al., 2012, Considine and Lewis 2003).  It can be assumed that decentralisation and NPM allow 
for more leeway of action on lower levels of policy implementation. Marketization and 
collaboration, on the other hand, aim at broadening the set of actors from classical actors (e.g. 
public employment service, PES) to other actors assumed to have more knowledge about 
needs of unemployed individual (Considine 2001:28), either because they are more close to 
the beneficiary group (NGOs for example) or due to external mechanisms (market actors).  
However,  as already outlined above, the introduction of marketization in employment policies 
goes beyond the aim to broaden the scope of actors involved in service delivery and has often 
taken place in the context of NPM discourses (Pollitt et al 2007), often justified by the 
assumption that contestability will increase provision efficiency and effectiveness. By 
marketized services, we mean measures and instruments where the delivery is based on a 
competitive selection procedure. Marketization it has become common characteristic of 
service provision, albeit if in different forms (Van Berkel et al., 2012) and to different degrees, 
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across European countries. Diversity seems to exist across various dimensions, such as the 
relationship between purchaser and provider or between the provider and the client. 
Nevertheless, the question remains how these different forms of marketization are 
implemented. This can only be answered taking into account the scope of action which local 
actors have towards the provision of marketized services. As will be outlined below, different 
forms of regulating these services exist, as well as different scopes of local leeway to 
implement the marketized measures. In this paper, based on the analytical framework 
developed below, we aim at analysing both these dimensions (the regulation of the services 
itself and the level of local discretion they imply) in the UK, Germany, and Italy. As it will be 
stated, the analysis shows a clear link between the regulation of market-based interventions 
and the level of local discretion regarding their usage. 
Marketization as a New Form of Governing the Provision of Labour Market Services 
As outlined above, activation reforms increased the scope of labour market services provided 
to the unemployed. Marketization brings two new aspects into the governance of social policy: 
competition and tendering. The tasks to be outsourced can vary from simple job placements to 
more complex social services. Criteria for selecting a competitive provider include cost and 
quality (van Berkel et al., 2012) and the performance is usually rewarded in form of financial 
payments (Considine and Lewis 2003), either based on strict (outcome) or soft performance 
measures (process-related) (van Berkel et al., 2012). Contracts can be designed in short-term 
or long-term and they can be targeted at different groups of unemployed. 
The different characteristics of marketization of concern in this paper are the level of control 
that national or sub-national public bodies exert over potential providers (requirements that 
need to be met by them); service delivery discretion (process specification: what is to be 
delivered); and service users’ choice over providers. Though, marketization is not a 
standardized phenomenon or a static process (van Berkel et al., 2012), it makes sense to assess 
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marketization models as shown in table 1: ranging from no- to full-regulation and hybrid types 
in between. These types of marketization, based on regulation characteristics, are related to 
the degree of discretion of local actors in implementing marketization, and to the purchaser-
provider split as it is mentioned below.   
According to van Berkel et al., (2012b) ideal-typical marketization involves a clear split between 
purchasers and providers of services, in order to encourage efficiency and responsiveness to citizens’ 
preferences, although in most cases this split is not strictly implemented. Therefore, the governance 
of marketized activation measures is not only regulated regarding the characteristics of the measure 
(delivery, clients’ choice and providers’ control), but also regarding the discretion that core agencies 
in the field of activation have towards these services.  
The regulation of the services, how strictly the purchaser-provider split is implemented, and also 
where the decision on outsourcing is taken (centralised or decentralised) are crucial for the 
implementation of marketized activation services, as they allow more or less local discretion. Figure 1 
summarizes the link between the regulation of marketization, the level of local discretion, and the 
purchaser-provider split.  
Studying the implementation of marketized activation policies therefore requires an analysis of 
existing regulation in this policy field in order to understand the room of manoeuvre 
implementing actors have. However, if we are interested in the translation of activation 
principles via marketization of service-delivery, we must as well study the usage of the local 
discretion. Which local factors influence the adaption and implementation of market-based 
activation services by local actors? This question should be addressed in an explorative manner 
on the basis of three in-depth case studies. 
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3. Research Design 
We chose our research design in a way to represent most different cases of welfare regimes 
and worlds of activation: one Anglo-Saxon, one Continental and one Southern European 
welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1996, Ferrera 1996). From the literature, it would be expected 
the Anglo-Saxon case (UK) to be more prone to marketization than the Continental (Germany) 
or the Southern European case (Italy). At the same time, the UK traditionally highly centralised 
policy-making (Minas et al., 2012) stands out compared to the other two cases (Bonoli 2001). 
The theoretical reasoning – which follows historical neo-institutional premises (Pierson 2000) –  
supporting the hypothesis is that, in times of welfare state retrenchment (Ferrera and 
Hemerijck 2005) less state-centred welfare states will be more inclined to provide more 
opportunities for private actors or social enterprises to act as policy implementers.  
Therefore, due to the relevant and traditional role of the family in the Southern European case 
and the highly relevant role of the social partners in the Continental case, we will expect the 
UK to have gone further in the direction of marketization, with Germany and Italy showing less 
marketized activation policies but higher levels of local discretion. The paper aims at testing 
these hypotheses by analyzing the regulation of marketized interventions in each country in 
the context of activation reforms. Our study is based on an in-depth analysis of the legislative 
regulations of marketized ALMP-instruments in each of the three countries. Here, we will 
identify the different types of regulations of market-based interventions and identify the room 
for manoeuvre for implementing actors. The detailed analysis of national expenditure on 
market-based interventions, in the framework of active labour market polices (ALMPs), show 
the extent to which ALMPs are market-based. On the basis of EUROSTAT ALMP qualitative 
reports (EU COM 2013) and the EUROSTAT ALMP database, we provide data for both optional 
and obligatory marketized interventions in Italy, UK and Germany.  In addition, by going 
beyond the analysis of regulative aspects, the role of the usage of local discretion in the 
8 
 
implementation of marketized interventions and its effects on service delivery is of crucial 
interest. Here, we aim at exploring local factors influencing the usage of the discretion.  
The local cases which were chosen for this explorative analysis are Edinburgh (UK), Milan 
(Italy) and Oldenburg (Germany). From a methodological standpoint, the research has been 
conducted via documentary analysis and, for the local case studies, 73 interviews with key 
stakeholders have been conducted – 21 in Edinburgh2, 29 in Oldenburg3 and 23 in Milan4. All 
interviewees hold senior roles, such as head of department, director, or senior manager, 
within their organisations and are in charge of at least minor decisions regarding the usage of 
market-based interventions in their territorial unit. Interviews took place in the spring/summer 
of 2012. Questions focused on operational governance of activation policy development and 
implementation and on the relations between policy levels, fields and stakeholders. The 
selection of interviewees was done following the so-called positional method (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2005) and the interviews, which lasted an hour on average, were mostly recorded, and 
transcribed, were analysed using a method of qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2003).  
4. Market-Based Interventions in Activation Policies in 
United Kingdom, Germany and Italy 
United Kingdom 
Marketization of labour market policies in the UK has taken place since, at least, the 1970s, 
with a progression since then towards contracting-out, competition and targets (Damm 2012, 
Hudson et al., 2010, Freud 2007). One of the main arguments for the use of marketisation has 
been the claim of efficiency and effectiveness (Davies 2010), despite mixed evidence (Davies 
2010, Hudson et al., 2010, National Audit Office 2006, Hasluck and Green 2007). Employment 
policy and income maintenance transfers are controlled centrally, while there is administrative 
decentralization via Jobcentre Plus (JCP). UK employment policy has therefore been 
characterised as “centralised localism” (Lødemel 2001, in Lindsay and McQuaid 2008).  
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From the 1990s, ALMPs, usually consistent with work-first approaches (Lindsay et al., 2007), 
have increased in the UK. Current welfare policies are generic in terms of groups targeted, 
access is generally determined by unemployment length and service users do not have a 
choice of provision or provider. There has been a net-widening of individuals mandate to 
participate on national welfare-to-work initiatives. 
Client services are the dominant active labour market instruments in the UK, and 
marketization is highly specialized and well established in this field. Vocational training in the 
UK in many cases is not directly linked to ALMPs5, due perhaps to the fact that it is funded by 
central devolved governments through skills agencies6.  We can identify a closer interaction 
between basic training aspects and client services, expanded now through the recently 
introduced skills conditionality in activation policies7. There are a number of national ‘Get 
Britain Working’ welfare-to-work programmes (GOV.UK), which the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) contracts-out nationally, to private, public or third sector organisations. There 
is no discretion by local government or JCP in national initiatives, unless specified. The level of 
provider discretion depends on the nature of the programme and contract. The short-term 
unemployed and ‘inactive’ groups are the responsibility of JCP, which provides direct support 
and advice, and refers clients to external provision; in some cases it contracts-out other 
services (such as training and placements or specialist provision) although contracts are with 
the DWP (DWP 2007). JCP role, function, and service delivery are determined nationally by the 
DWP, although providers and partners may vary across the country. Local discretion is very 
limited, although more flexibility in service provision is being introduced by the current 
Coalition Government (JCP 2011) through the Flexible Support Fund.  
The current national welfare-to-work policy for the long-term unemployed is the Work 
Programme, which replaces a number of previous programmes. It is mandatory for up to two 
years for certain benefit claimants (DWP 2012a) and sanctions are imposed for non-
participation. Providers have complete service discretion due to the black-box approach to 
10 
 
service delivery. The approach aims to increase flexibility that should, it is claimed, allow 
individualisation and effectiveness. There are a number of concerns on the capacity/ability of 
providers to meet complex needs of users, based on previous programmes’ evidence, but 
there is not enough publicly available data at present to determine provision in the Work 
Programme. The level of in-housed or outsourced services provided the prime providers 
interviewed varied.  Similar to other national initiatives, payment is by results, although the 
criterion to draw full payment includes a longer sustainability requirement. Differential 
payments depending on the benefit type that the service user is claiming have also being 
introduced, attempting to tackle the ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’ effect of outcome-based 
activation programmes (Casebourne et al., 2006 in Davies 2010). The tendering process has 
been novel to some extent due to the requirement for organisations to have no less than a £20 
million annual turnover: as a result, many private, public and mainly third sector organisations 
were unable to compete (Damm 2012). The requirement to have supply chains could balance 
this exclusion, although there are no further requirements in their use. Longer contract length 
(up to 7 years) aims to tackle criticism of short-contracts continuity difficulties.  
Local councils have responsibility for local employability and economic strategy, but not for 
employment policy. Interviewees mentioned that local strategies are constrained by central 
government policy and budget allocation. Local government-funded employability services are 
mostly contracted-out through tendering (CEC 2011). In Edinburgh, outcome-based contracts 
are developed around the Hub Contract (an employability pipeline approach) which aims at 
making services seamless by wrapping around the individual.,. An interviewee tellingly recalls 
the reasoning behind the contract: ‘you will get far more actual on-the-ground integration 
from a contractualised arrangement that from another 10 years’ worth of encouraging 
collaboration’.  
In summary, marketization in national UK employment services has not implied client choice of 
service or provider and local discretion is very low or non-existent in most cases. This is the 
11 
 
case for services directed to the short-term unemployed (provided via JCP) and for the long-
term unemployed. Local government employability provision has arguably increased choice, 
although grant funding could have achieved similar results. Generally bids are assessed in 
terms of cost/quality although there have been concerns that national contracting is heavily 
decided on cost.  
Local discretion by JCP could allow individualisation and localisation of service-provision. It is 
difficult to assess if bigger contracts such as the Work Programme, will bring individualisation, 
although sustainability and differential payments could encourage that. Nevertheless if 
competitive contractualisation promotes unrealistic targets set up by providers in order to win 
contracts (Damm 2012), due to funding decisions based on cost (Osborne et al., 2012, 
Simmonds 2011), the effect could be of inadequate support for those hardest to help. It is 
interesting nevertheless that in order to achieve multi-stakeholder coordination (horizontal 
coordination), the Work Programme at national level, and the Hub Contract at local level could 
rationalised the providers landscape through contracts acting as case-management ‘centres’. 
The most dominant marketization type to be identified in national activation policies in the UK 
is therefore client regulation, followed by provider regulation in terms of cost and outcomes 
and service regulation for the short-term unemployed although currently decreasing, 
especially for the long-term unemployed. Furthermore, the UK is the only country with a clear 
purchaser-provider split (van Berkel et al., 2012).  
Germany  
German labor market policy is formulated at the national level and traditionally characterized 
by corporatism and hierarchical governance of the public employment service8. Vocational 
training was for a long time focused on the industrial model and delivered by social partners’ 
related training institutions or public providers. Social assistance as well as social services such 
as counseling, housing, etc. are to a great extent under subnational responsibility. Here, 
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service delivery was and is highly dominated by – often large and well organized – third sector 
organizations, in cooperation with public actors.  
Since the beginning of the 1990s, NPM reforms were introduced especially in local public 
administration, which affected also social services (Dahme et al.,2008).  Although contracting-
out of formerly public social services increased, this contracting-out is not always based on 
competitive tendering but on non-competitive commissioning. Nevertheless, competitive 
tendering can also be found in social services and the idea to open the market for new actors 
has also been implemented for the social sector. With regard to labor market policies, several 
reforms –the Hartz-reform package9 being the most important –introduced market-based 
instruments and NPM structures step-by-step.  In addition, the role of social partners in 
tripartite self-government was not abolished but significantly constrained. Marketization in 
ALMPs was limited to training and placement until 2012, when additional ‘activation 
measures’ targeted on increasing the opportunities for labour market integration were added 
to the scope of marketized services: These do not focus solely on quick labour market 
integration but can have the aim to reduce placement obstacles as a first step before taking up 
a job.  
With regard to the organizational dimension of the currently existing instruments, we can 
identify competitive contracting-out of service delivery and a voucher system. In the case of 
the voucher system, the dominant marketization type is provider regulation, while we can 
identify full regulation in competitive contracting-out: 
(1) The voucher system has been introduced in placement (2002) and training (2003). Since 
very recently (2012), the ‘activation and placement voucher’ can also be used for additional 
activation measures. The use of vouchers is voluntary but the choice by the client is limited to 
accredited providers. In addition, clients’ choices often seem to be dependent on case 
managers’ information, as Bruttel (2005) states, for both types of vouchers the practice of 
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consumers’ choice might not always be applicable due to information asymmetries and 
personal restrictions. 
(2) There is competitive contracting-out in training (since 2005, partly also before), placement 
(since 2002) and ‘activation measures’ (since 2012). All tendering processes are organized by 
the regional directorates of the FEA, which act as purchase centers. However, the leeway of 
local Jobcenters and employment agencies to define which kind of measures they need is 
relative high although they do not select the providers. The selection process is based both on 
cost and quality. There is no service users’ choice with regard to these measures. Cost-
efficiency and quality are mentioned as positive aspects while a lack of suitable training 
providers in rural areas and the destruction of existing cooperation structures due to 
competition are complains (Bernhard et al., 2008:28). It has been criticized that social 
partners’ related training providers have been favored before due to close relationships based 
on local tripartite structures (Kemmerling and Bruttel 2006). All private placement measures 
are judged as being easily subjected to ‘creaming’ practices. 
With regard to regulation, we can observe differences between training and 
placement/activation: while all training measures are obligatory and either contracted-out or 
voucher-based and therefore in no case provided by the PES, placement by private providers is 
optional. This means that there is no local discretion with regard to the decision whether 
training should be provided market-based or not, while the local PES can decide if they want to 
provide placement services in-house or outsourced. Therefore, both the decision on 
outsourcing and the purchaser-provider split depend on the service to be provided. 
Concerning the local practice, interviews showed that this difference in local discretion is 
definitely relevant for implementation: from the perspective of the local PES in Oldenburg, 
placement is mostly seen as a task for the public employment service. Both the delivery- and 
redemption rate of placement vouchers and the competitive contracting-out of placement 
services are quite low compared to the national average (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2011). 
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There are very few private placement providers in the region. However, when it comes to the 
new possibility of outsourcing activation measures, the usage of contracting-out has increased. 
Due to the quite high local discretion (‘a gum-paragraph’ as one interview partner put it) with 
regard to service delivery, Jobcenter actors use this instrument to finance individualized and 
integrated measures (linking basic skills with psycho-social counselling, etc.). Vouchers are 
perceived as more or less an inadequate instrument for beneficiaries in need of activation 
measures since they are often overwhelmed with the required choice.  
When it comes to training, we can find a totally different picture: local discretion in terms of 
the content of training measures is quite high and training-planning is based on their own 
analysis of the regional labor market. Nevertheless, outsourcing of training is obligatory, be it 
voucher-based or via tendering. In Oldenburg, vouchers are the most relevant instrument in 
training both for the Jobcenter and the employment agency.  According to the results of the 
local case study, clients’ choice is not a problem in most of the cases. Although the 
introduction of the market-based training has broadened the scope of providers, the PES still 
seems to cooperate with the same local providers if possible. Competition among training 
providers is mentioned as a crucial hinderer for effective service delivery, since cooperation 
and alignment is reduced.  
Both private placement (since 2012) and training providers (since 2003) offering voucher-
based measures, or participating in tendering-processes need to be accredited. This 
accreditation has been done until 2012 by de-facto public certification institutions while now 
the independent National Accreditation Body (DAkks, Nationale Akkreditierungsstelle) has 
taken over the responsibility. Results of the local case study emphasize what has been outlined 
in literature (Jantz and Klenk 2012): both accreditation and the complex tendering process 
privilege larger providers. Therefore, market entry relies on accreditation and tendering rules 
which have been dominated until recently by the de-facto purchaser, the Federal Employment 
Agency.  Nevertheless, although providers’ selection is highly formalized and local discretion is 
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that low, local PES actors seem to find ways to keep alive established cooperation with certain 
actors. 
To sum up, local PES actors therefore have a relative high leeway when it comes to service 
delivery, but local discretion is low with regard to providers’ control. The results of the German 
local case study show that local PES actors do certainly use this discretion in service delivery, 
which has impact on the scope of providers, the efficiency of service delivery and as well policy 
integration. Especially the recently installed possibility of contracting-out activation 
interventions and the high leeway in designing these measures lead to individualized and 
integrated services. Nevertheless, marketized instruments can be hinderers of cooperation 
since their high regulation strengthens the dominant position of the Federal Employment 
Agency. 
Italy 
In Italy, with respect to labour market policies, PES and education/vocational training, in 1997 
a comprehensive reform was adopted at the national level aimed at setting the stage for a 
process of decentralization of administrative functions to regional and local levels and 
marketization with respect to job counselling and temporary work. More specifically, the 1997 
Law known as the ‘Treu Package’ (“Measures for the promotion of employment”) innovated 
employment policy in a number of aspects. First, a gradual process of deregulation was 
undertaken through the provision of so called ‘atypical’, flexible contracts. The new legislation 
introduced “temporary agency work” contracts and measures aimed at increasing part-time 
jobs. Second, the traditional predominance of passive policies was limited, moving towards a 
more “equilibrated policy mix” (Graziano 2004) through the development of ALMP aimed at 
facilitating labour insertion especially of young people and disadvantaged groups. Third, the 
public monopoly on placement services was ended by allowing private temporary work 
agencies to fully operate. This policy innovation represented a fundamental change in Italian 
employment policy, as it relied on the acknowledgment that private actors and market 
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mechanisms could give a beneficial contribution to labour market performance (Jessoula and 
Alti 2010). The new marketization trend was further consolidated in 2003 with the so called 
Biagi Law which provided further opportunities for private agencies to perform labour market 
policies beyond mere temporary work (Jessoula et al., 2010). Currently, about 70 private 
agencies perform employment services functions at the national level (CIETT 2011:12), which 
include – beyond temporary work – job counselling, vocational training, career transition 
services, outsourcing and long term employment opportunities. Nevertheless, in Italy the 
overall number of ‘agency workers’ is still particularly low, also in comparative perspective 
(CIETT 2011:27). 
In general, in the case of employment policies, the central government via the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs remains the key actor. Although central institutions via specific 
directories have also generally carried the main responsibility with respect to the other tasks 
that fall under its sub-section "Social shock-absorbers and incentives for occupation", from the 
mid-1990s there have been clear signs of the creation of a new, open and multi-level 
governance model: since for several new policy programmes, regional levels of government 
including provinces, regions and municipalities have gained increased influence and 
responsibility in these services (ISFOL 2008).  
Social assistance has traditionally been covered primarily by local administrations and over the 
past twenty years local public administrations have increasingly ‘marketized’ several services 
(as in Milan). The reforms adopted in the late 1990s tried to introduce a national scheme in 
order to close the gap with other EU countries where minimum income schemes had already 
been developed. In this respect, the 1998-2001 period did witness the experiment of a 
nationally managed social assistance scheme in the form of minimum insertion income (RMI). 
This activation measure was meant for unemployed citizens living on an income below a 
certain threshold. The guidelines were set on a national level, to be further determined and 
implemented by the regions, in cooperation with the municipalities and local health centres. 
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Furthermore, in the field of social assistance in the formulation of the Local Programming 
Plans, the reform called on local non-institutional actors (such as NGOs, trade unions and 
individual citizens) to participate in the local programming (and implementation) activities. 
This was an open door to subsidized private social assistance services, which were offered by 
NGOs or cooperatives in the various fields of social assistance policy. More specifically, private 
actors have been involved in local welfare via public administration contracting-out, 
accreditation and partnerships in the co-formulation of local welfare plans. Within the social 
assistance policy field, the main private actors have been non-profit actors, unlike those who 
have become increasingly relevant in employment policy. Given the fragmentation of Italian 
social assistance and the large differences across the country regarding both the levels of need 
and the availability of resources to meet these needs, it is impossible to provide a general 
picture concerning the activation services available for Italian social assistance recipients 
(Madama 2010).  
Opening the provision of employment services to private actors has partly been a consequence 
of the flexibilization of the Italian labour market, which has been accompanied as mentioned 
previously by the establishment of (private) temporary work agencies for matching supply and 
demand where temporary work and work on fixed-term contracts is concerned. The dominant 
marketization types to be identified in Italy are full regulation (in training and social assistance) 
and client regulation (in employment services). With respect to activation, whether services 
are provided in-house or outsourced is decided by (local, i.e. provincial) public agencies. In 
fact, since there is the opportunity of outsourcing for all active labour market instruments, 
both traditional employment services and vocational training – which is the most relevant part 
of active labour market instruments in Italy (cf. figure 1) - have been ‘marketized’. Therefore, 
we cannot identify a clear purchaser-provider split but a decentralised decision on outsourcing 
in employment policies.  
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Marketization has been even more evident in the case of social assistance policies. For 
example, in the case of Milan (one of the most important and populated Italian cities) by the 
end of 2000s the overall employment and social assistance policy10 accounted for roughly 40 
per cent of the local total expenditure on social assistance policies11 (Suriano 2011:14).  
In summary, the intense period of reforms (1997-2012) has promoted a new governance 
architecture that allocates political-administrative responsibilities to the state, regions and 
municipalities on the principle of vertical subsidiarity, and at the same time increasing 
marketization with respect to both labour market and social assistance policies has occurred. 
The (possible) benefits of marketization are still to be fully assessed but some preliminary 
remarks can be put forward. First, marketization is much more developed in the social 
assistance sector than in the labour market policies. The latter set of policies have been only 
marginally touched by marketization trend since the passive policies are still managed by 
(primarily national public bodies) and (decentralized) PES are the most important providers. 
Vocational training has been significantly reformed, both in terms of decentralization and 
marketization, and this has particularly empowered the regional level of regulation since in 
several regions vocational training agencies have to be ‘accreditated’ by regional public 
authorities. The former set of policies, being traditionally organized at the local level, have 
gone through quite an intense marketization process which has created new opportunities for 
private actors in social service provision: the above mentioned example of Milan shows how 
relevant outsourcing may be in local social assistance policies. Second, in terms of labour 
market policies the main consequence of the new public-private mix has been greater 
targeting of employment services – although this regards only a very limited amount of 
workers, as highlighted above. Third, in the social assistance sector marketization has not only 
better targeted the services provided but also enables them to be better monitored by both 
private (or ‘social private’, as they are often labelled in Italian) companies and public 
institutions.  
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5. Comparative Discussion  
As the country analyses outline, all our three cases have experienced marketization to some degree. 
Nevertheless, we can observe differences in the extent to which labour market instruments are 
based on competitive contracting out in the three countries. Figure 2 illustrates these differences on 
the basis of those interventions which are included in the EUROSTAT ALMP-database: it shows the 
share of expenditure on market-based interventions with regard to the total active labour market 
expenditure, including ‘labour market services’ which are often contracted out.12  
Here we can observe that in the UK almost all active measures are market-based, while Italy and 
Germany show much lower figures. However, we can observe increasing marketization in both 
countries between 2005 and 2009 (no current data available). All national programmes have 
experienced marketization, and attempts are visible to regulate these also in regard to their local 
implementation. Whereas in the UK most market-based interventions are highly regulated on the 
national level (with regard to clients, providers, and/or delivery), in Italy there are only few 
regulations, for example on providers. In Germany, marketization is most highly regulated, which 
might be the result of merging a national scheme (employment policy) with an inherently local 
scheme (social assistance).  
At the same time, we find differences in the way in which market-based interventions are regulated, 
and in the degree of local level discretion. So: what are the drivers of these different patterns of 
marketization? First of all, marketization seems to depend to some extent on the policy field in 
question: in Germany training and labour market services (such as job brokerage, counselling, etc.) 
are both of relevance in contracting-out, in the UK is mostly client services and in Italy training which 
matters more respectively. 
Especially in Germany marketization differs broadly between training and client services in 
terms of the marketization type, the purchaser-provider split, and the decision on outsourcing. 
In Italy, we can find different marketization types for employment services and training but 
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conformity regarding the decision on outsourcing and the purchaser-provider split. In UK, 
there is no such difference between the types of measures due to the fact that vocational 
training is less directly linked to ALMPs, however some variations are observed concerning 
services targeted to the short- or long-term unemployed.  
Figure 3 shows the variance in the decision on outsourcing: here, all labour market 
interventions based on competitive contracting out were summed up and compared to the 
total LMP-expenditures (including passive benefits, which were excluded in figure 2).  
In the UK, all market-based measures are contracted out; local actors have no choice in this 
question. In Italy, we find a totally different picture: here, the decision on outsourcing is 
decentralised and local actors have an increasing opportunity to decide autonomously. In 
Germany, this question depends on the type of measures. However, the degree of discretion is 
low as only about 2 per cent of these interventions (labour market services) are optional, while 
the others (vocational training) are necessarily to be outsourced.  
However, local discretion does not only depend on the decision on outsourcing, but also is 
influence by type of marketized services’ regulation and the purchaser provider split. Table 2 
summarizes the findings of the analysis of the regulation of market-based interventions in all 
three countries.  
We can observe a clear link between the regulation of market-based interventions and the 
level of discretion regarding their usage, which is significantly low in the UK, very high in Italy, 
and in Germany depends on the type of measures. However, what do these results tell us 
about implementation of activation policies on the local level?  
In Germany, we can observe a contradictory constellation of institutional designs: an attempt 
of nationalization via regulating the use of market instruments is counter-acted through local 
policy implementation, which is related to formerly local schemes based on strong 
relationships with the social partners. Marketization in this context is not necessarily seen as 
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helping to achieve greater labour market integration, especially as it is so highly regulated and 
thus relatively inflexible. The higher the leeway of local actors the lower seems to be the 
interest of outsourcing these interventions: local actors do not see a necessity to broaden the 
scope of actors to ensure targeted services, due to an already well-established broad 
landscape of service provision; marketization is not judged as an adequate measure to ensure 
individual responsibility which is perceived as relevant for some unemployed, but not as a 
general aim to be enforced. However, the argument of cost-efficiency has been made by 
several local actors.  
In the UK there is a more centralised institutional context: on the one hand the national-local 
link is secured through bypassing the local level through direct contracts of providers with the 
DWP. But even where there are instances of local policy making (employability programmes), 
these are evidently framed by a national context and use almost exclusively marketized 
approaches. There is a broad scope of actors on services provision, and horizontal coordination 
in seen as necessary in a mostly fragmentised landscape (e.g. the integrated Hub-Contract). 
Recent reforms maintain a high level of individual responsibility, could increase local discretion 
of PES, and could impact on the provider landscape by using marketization to rationalised it.  
The relatively high degree of marketization on both levels in Italy might be due to the 
combination of rather unregulated and flexible national marketization programmes and a local 
level more akin to implementing interventions that favour private actors. On the one hand, the 
principle of subsidiarity prevalent in Southern European welfare states might be more 
conducive to the acknowledgement of individual actors rather than of collective efforts. On the 
other hand, marketization of the rather undeveloped social assistance scheme faced no 
opposition from weak networks of local stakeholders. Again we see an influence of the policy 
field and its history: Whereas social assistance policy as a local programme experiences high 
degrees of marketization, employment policy experiences barriers to marketization since it is 
based on management of national bodies and public local providers. Despite this difference it 
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is interesting to note that marketized programmes in employment policy in Italy have seen 
greater involvement of private actors than marketized programmes in social assistance policy, 
which are based on the involvement of ‘social’ providers, such as NGO’s, cooperatives and self-
help groups.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This explorative study set out to describe and analyse both regulation and implementation in 
marketization of activation policies in different types of welfare states. Marketization certainly 
has become an important part of policy delivery in most welfare states. Despite minor national 
differences, in all of our cases we can observe national reforms emphasising marketization and 
regulating different aspects of it. Here, we can observe a clear link between the regulation of 
market-based interventions and the level of discretion for local actors with regard to these 
measures. The type of marketization, the decision on outsourcing and the purchaser-provider 
split are highly relevant determinants of regulating market-based instruments. As the analysis 
showed, regulations often depend on the type of interventions, which also leads to different 
levels of discretion.  
With regard to the usage of this discretion, the explorative results show that it depends on the 
local contexts of policy-making and their suitability and willingness to become marketized. For 
example, even though local discretion is relatively high both in Italy and Germany, we observe 
much lower degrees of marketization in Germany and more opposition to use market-based 
interventions: The local context in this case is framed by long-established networks between 
public actors and social partners, thus inhibiting the involvement of a broader set of actors. In 
the UK levels of local discretion are weak and the national level has secured the 
implementation of marketization via a centralised system that combines regulating access of 
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clients and service providers. In Italy, national policy history has been partly supportive and 
partly inhibitive to marketization. On the local level, however, it seems that the marketized 
character of interventions was over-shadowed by the general changes in social assistance, 
which had only recently been introduced.  
Activation principles such as individual responsibility and the need of a broader scope of actors 
to ensure targeted services are therefore only to a small extent translated into practice via 
marketization of service delivery. Although the objectives of a NPM paradigm are obviously 
inherent in marketized activation measures in all countries, they do not seem to affect local 
implementation effectively which is more dependent on local discretion and affected by local 
policy histories. In summary, notwithstanding a common marketization trend, its reach and its 
multilevel domestic adaptation varied in function of the embedded relationships (and its 
legacy) among levels of governments and stakeholders and not – as hypothesised – in function 
of the welfare regime type. Moreover, this study calls for a more in-depth analysis of the 
implementation of market-based interventions in more local entities in different types of 
countries, linking the level of local discretion defined by regulation of interventions with the 
local context.  
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Notes
                                                          
1
 This paper is based on research conducted within the framework of a European FP7project (LOCALISE – 
further information www.localise-research.eu). 
2
 Two interviews were conducted with national and local government officials, four with public agencies, 
twelve with service providers and three with local experts.  
3
 Seven interviews were conducted with the PES, six with public administration, two with municipal politicians, 
four with social partners, seven with service providers, and three with other organisations. 
4
 Six interviews were conducted with local government, ten with local bureaucrats, one with the public 
employment service, three with service providers, and three with federations. 
5
 In some instances training is directly mentioned within active policies, such as Sector-based Work Academies.  
6
 Skills Funding Agency in England and Wales (a partner organisation of the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills), and Skills Development Scotland in Scotland (an executive non-departmental public 
body of the Scottish Government). 
7
 Introduce in England in August 2011 and Scotland June 2012. Claimants of Jobseekers Allowance or 
Employment Support Allowance work-related activity group can be mandated to undertake skills activity (DWP, 
2012b) 
8
 The German public employment service is the Federal Employment Agency (FEA), a public body under 
tripartite self-government. Service delivery for the relative status maintaining, earnings-related and 
limited unemployment insurance (UB I, Arbeitslosengeld I) is implemented by the local employment 
agencies. Service delivery for the tax-financed, flat-rate and needs-tested so-called unemployment 
benefit II (UB II, Arbeitslosengeld II) is administered in the local Jobcenters, which are in the majority of 
the cases a cooperation between municipalities and FEA  
9
 The Hartz-reforms between 2003 and 2005 introduced highly relevant changes in governance 
structures, labor market instruments and the minimum income system of German labor market policies.  
10
 It included – beyond public institutions – 148 foundations, 220 social cooperatives, about 200 associations, 
147 voluntary organizations and 206 self-help groups (Suriano 2011:6). 
11
 Which accounted for an overall outsourcing value of 645 Million euros. 
12
 This means that the expenditure of all single measures based on contracting-out were summed up and 
compared to the total expenditure, except passive benefits. EUROSTAT LMP category 1 includes labour market 
services such as counselling, Public Employment Service administration, job brokerage etc., while the 
categories 2-7 contain measures on training, employment incentives, job creation or start-up incentives (cf. 
EUROSTAT 2013) 
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Table 1: Type of marketization 
Marketized Services’ 
Regulation 
Service users’ / 
clients’ choice 
Providers Service delivery 
Unregulated  Client choice No controls (based 
primarily on cost) 
No controls (only outcome 
performance) 
Client regulation  No client choice No controls (based 
primarily on cost)  
No controls (only outcome 
performance) 
Provider regulation Client choice Criteria imposed (e.g. 
cost and quality, etc.) 
No controls (only outcome 
performance) 
Service regulation Client choice No controls (based 
primarily on cost) 
Process or type of service 
determined 
Full regulation No client choice Criteria imposed (e.g. 
cost and quality, etc.) 
Process or type of service 
determined 
Source: own depiction, based on van Berkel et al., 2012 
 
Table 2: Varieties of Regulation 
 UK Germany Italy 
Regulation of 
Marketized 
Services 
Client regulation 
or full regulation in 
some client services 
Training: full regulation 
Client services: provider 
regulation 
Training and social assistance: 
full regulation;  
Client services: client 
regulation 
Decision on 
outsourcing 
Centralised Mixed (depending on type 
of intervention) 
Decentralised 
Purchaser-
providersplit 
Split Mixed (depending on type 
of intervention) 
No split 
LOCAL 
DISCRETION 
LOW DEPENDING ON TYPE OF 
MEASURE 
HIGH 
Source: own depiction 
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Figure 1: Regulation of marketization and discretion of local actors 
  
       LOW LOCAL DISCRETION                                                            HIGH LOCAL DISCRETION 
  
Marketised services Full 
regulation 
Client  
regulation 
Service 
regulation 
Provider  
regulation 
Unregulated 
 
Decision on outsourcing 
 
Centralised 
 
Mixed 
 
                       Decentralised 
Purchaser-provider split Split Mixed                No split 
Source: own depiction 
 
 
Figure 2: Market-based interventions as share of expenditure on active labour market policies (ALMP 2-
7) and labour market services (ALMP 1)  
 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations 
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Figure 3: Market-based interventions as share of total LMP-expenditure (2007) 
 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations 
 
 
